

# Final exam in

## Web Security EITF05

Department of Electrical and Information Technology  
Lund University


October 30<sup>th</sup>, 2015, 14.00–19.00

- You may answer in either Swedish or English.
- If any data is lacking, make (and state) reasonable assumptions.
- Use legible hand writing. If your answers cannot be read, you will receive zero points on that problem.
- Grading is done as follows.  
Grade 3 = 20–29 points,  
Grade 4 = 30–39 points,  
Grade 5 = 40–50 points.

Good luck!

Paul

**Problem 1.** Consider the following illustration of an XSS attack.




- Explain how an XSS attack works, detailing where JavaScript(s) reside and are executed. You may refer to the picture.
- Does TLS protect against XSS attacks? Motivate.
- Does the same-origin policy protect against XSS attacks? Motivate.

(3 points)

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**Problem 2.** Consider the following illustration of a CSRF attack.



- Explain how a CSRF attack works. You may refer to the picture.
- Explain how CSRF protection with synchronizer token pattern works.
- CSRF attacks are possible even when Alice has disabled JavaScript in her browser. Describe one feasible scenario.

(3 points)

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**Problem 3.** A DKIM signature header of an email is given below.

```
DKIM-Signature:  
v=1;  
a=rsa-sha256;  
c=simple/relaxed;  
d=gmail.com;  
s=gamma;  
h=received:message-id:date:from:to:subject:mime-version:content-type;  
bh=9gicsZnlcLK7yYh6VIrgyAMMRZiWsSbWqSPIhc78RRk=;  
b=k4ofvpHPkaQmvuSoGVhRrnCsPK+JEuv9KUrZ07aiypvf/6Y1N2iIatvLvdzw0nZX  
/W6Kxyx6Z4Ybuk8Dqk/vNTIE7Jpy+GQUUHFvMONFtmZo1CbGRvo8DdHnXRBB/qWw  
1V+Z6wxw/mq71NuJknVprOaATLws5mwcZ+AWL8KwHg0=
```


- How can the client verify that she has obtained the correct public key (for signature verification)?
- Can a domain use different keys for different users or groups of users? Motivate.
- How does DKIM provide integrity protection for the message part of the email? (What is signed, and how?)

(3 points)

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**Problem 4.** A company has a problem with a communication channel, and you have been hired to resolve the issue. The problem is as follows.

Device A sends single control bytes to device B. A uni-directional channel that requires printable characters to be sent is used, so each byte is Base64-encoded before it is sent from A, and Base64-decoded before it is interpreted at B.



Recently, the Base64 decoder was replaced with a new and improved implementation. However, after this upgrade, only a small fraction of the messages are delivered – most are discarded by the decoder.

One particular message that could be transmitted before but not after the upgrade is "wd==".

- a) Explain what the most likely problem is, and how it should be fixed.
- b) What exact fraction of the messages does the new decoder discard? Assume uniform distribution where applicable.

**Hint 1:** Symbol w is 0x30 and d is 0x1D in Base64.

**Hint 2:** The following section is from RFC4648 titled "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings".

### 3.5. Canonical Encoding

The padding step in base 64 and base 32 encoding can, if improperly implemented, lead to non-significant alterations of the encoded data. For example, if the input is only one octet for a base 64 encoding, then all six bits of the first symbol are used, but only the first two bits of the next symbol are used. These pad bits **MUST** be set to zero by conforming encoders, which is described in the descriptions on padding below. If this property do not hold, there is no canonical representation of base-encoded data, and multiple base-encoded strings can be decoded to the same binary data. If this property (and others discussed in this document) holds, a canonical encoding is guaranteed.

In some environments, the alteration is critical and therefore decoders **MAY** chose to reject an encoding if the pad bits have not been set to zero. The specification referring to this may mandate a specific behaviour.

(2+1 points)

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**Problem 5.** Consider a Hashcash solution in which a string

$$ver : bits : date : resource : rand : counter$$

is hashed using SHA-1, where

*ver* is version number (currently 1),  
*bits* indicates how costly the function is for sender,  
*date* gives current date,  
*resource* is recipients email address,  
*rand* is a random number.

- a) Explain the principles of Hashcash, and detail the relationship between the *counter* and *bits* parameters.
- b) How can HashCash be misused if the *rand* parameter is removed from the protocol?

(2+1 points)

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**Problem 6.** An IPv4 address is a group of four numbers from 0 to 255 (inclusive) separated by dots, as in 127.0.0.1, 130.235.202.25, and so on.

Write regular expressions for matching the following.

- a) All IPv4 addresses, with no additional restriction on the numbers.
- b) All IPv4 addresses, restricting all four numbers to  $0, \dots, 255$ .

**Hint 1:** You may disregard leading zeros.

(1.5+1.5 points)

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**Problem 7.** Consider Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC).

- a) Explain how the correctness of the public key in DNSKEY is verified. Compare the procedure to that of verifying a certificate.
- b) How can NSEC and NSEC3 provide precomputed answers for *all* requests? (What trick is used?)
- c) Describe one very significant problem with DNSSEC.

(3 points)

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
**Problem 8.** Explain how Content Security Policy (CSP) works.

(3 points)

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**Problem 9.** Consider the following illustration of a DNS rebinding attack.


- Referring to the picture below, explain how JavaScript is used in a DNS rebinding attack.
- Why will the attack fail if the attacker instructs the script to go directly to `www.target.com`? Motivate. (Which protection mechanism is triggered in this case?)
- What can the target server (`www.target.com`) do to avoid serving content in DNS rebinding attacks? (How can it detect DNS rebinding attacks?)



(3 points)

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**Problem 10.** Consider the following illustration of an HTTP response splitting attack.



- Referring to the picture, briefly explain how an HTTP response splitting attack works.
- Write some PHP code that enables the attack. Your code does not need to be syntactically correct, but it should show a feasible case.
- What would happen if the proxy was not a *caching* proxy?

(3 points)

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
**Problem 11.** HTTP digest authentication (RFC2617) is a challenge response protocol in which the client calculates the digest (the response) according to

$$\text{MD5}(\text{MD5}(A1) : \textit{nonce} : \textit{nc} : \textit{cnonce} : \textit{qop} : \text{MD5}(A2) ),$$

with

$$A1 = \textit{username} : \textit{realm} : \textit{password},$$

$$A2 = \begin{cases} \textit{method} : \textit{URI} & \text{if } \textit{qop} = \textit{auth}, \\ \textit{method} : \textit{URI} : \text{MD5}(\textit{entity-body}) & \text{if } \textit{qop} = \textit{auth-int}. \end{cases}$$



- Explain the usage and purpose of the *qop* parameter?
- Explain the usage and purpose of the *nonce* parameter.
- In which form are the credentials stored on the server?
- Both *nonce* and *cnonce* are randomly selected strings, so why is it that the *cnonce* parameter protects against a MITM that can modify messages and has TMTO/Rainbow capabilities, when the *nonce* parameter does not?

(1+1+1+2 points)

**Problem 12.** You have successfully stolen a database from a popular website using an SQL injection. Passwords in this database have been salted with a site-wide salt, same for all passwords, and then hashed with SHA3-512. You have full access to the database, and the salt is known to you. You want to recover as many passwords as possible, so you are considering a TMTO attack with parameters  $t$ ,  $n$  and  $\ell$ . That is, the TMTO attack uses  $t$  tables, each with  $n$  start-/endpoint pairs (SP/EP-pairs), with chains of length  $\ell$ .


- Why will you not find pre-built tables online that you can use?
- Explain how chains are constructed using the hash- and reduction functions.
- Explain why and how hash table(s) are used during password recovery.
- In terms of  $t$ ,  $n$  and  $\ell$ , what is the expected time-complexity for recovery of *one* password? (How many hash table lookups?)

**Hint 1:** Alternatively, you may answer the same question for a rainbow attack setting with parameters  $n$  and  $\ell$  as above (one table). If you do so, please state this clearly.

**Hint 2:** Hash tables can provide  $O(1)$  lookup time. That is, lookups into a hash table can be performed in constant time, regardless of how many entries that are stored.

(1+1+2+1 points)

**Problem 13.** Consider the following illustration of a DNS cache poisoning attack.



- Why is DNS spoofing (DNS cache poisoning) trivial for an adversary that can observe outgoing traffic (2a, 2b and 2c above) from the DNS server?
- Modern DNS implementations do not only randomize transaction IDs. What else do they randomize?
- How would usage of TCP (instead of UDP) protect against DNS cache poisoning attacks?
- Make a reasonable estimate of how long it would take for an attacker to succeed with a DNS cache poisoning attack for a moderately popular website. State your assumptions, estimates and approximations along with your calculation.

(1+1+1+2 points)

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**Problem 14.** Briefly explain the following terms.

- Birthday paradox
- SPF
- CORS
- Greylisting
- Idempotent HTTP method

(5 points)

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